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Abstract This paper maps the ethical issues that arise in the
context of personalised medicine. First, it highlights the ethical
problems related to increased predictive power of modern
diagnostic interventions. Such problems emerge because the
ability to identify individuals or groups of individuals that can
potentially benefit from a particular therapeutic intervention
also raises a question of personal responsibility for health-
related behaviour and lifestyle. The second major area of
ethical concern is related to health prevention and distributive
justice. The paper discusses the ethical challenges brought by
the personalised medicine in the context of the Additional
Protocol to the Convention onHumanRights and Biomedicine
concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes. Finally, it
notes that the issue of consent in the context of biobanks, the
need to rethink the prevalent models of research designs and to
communicate relevant findings to the donors of biological
materials deserve further discussion.
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Introduction
According to the well-known 20th-century American
physicist and philosopher of science Thomas Samuel Kuhn,
from time to time sciences face “paradigm shifts”. These
“paradigm shifts” open up new approaches and bring
remarkable changes to their development. It seems that
the editorial of the first issue of The EPMA Journal marks a
similar shift in medicine when it describes the paradigm
change from delayed interventional nature of traditional
medicine to the concept of predictive, preventive and
personalised medicine [1]. For the sake of brevity, in the
remainder of this article we will refer to this new concept of
medicine as “personalised medicine”. According to the
editorial, this change marks a new philosophy in patient
treatment as it moves away from a reactive approach of
curing diseases that have already developed to a more
proactive, preventive strategy to tackle human diseases
before they start disrupting the functioning of a person. It
seems that the philosophy of personalised medicine brings
about messages, which can also be important from the
ethical point of view. First, it expects the emerging and
future diagnostic interventions to be much more accurate
and therefore conducive to better treatment results due to
both early detection of diseases and targeted therapeutic
interventions on intervention-specific subgroups of patients.
Second, personalised medicine also suggests to strengthen
the patient’s responsibility to follow the measures of disease
prevention and to comply with the procedures of early
interventions, which can help to cope with the disease in its
early stage of development. Compliance with these meas-
ures is a crucial condition to achieve the mentioned benefits
of more accurate diagnostics and more efficient therapeutic
interventions. Last but not least, personalised medicine
aims to develop preventive strategies to avoid the emer-
gence of pathological conditions in the first place.
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These seem to be very much welcome developments.
They can bring benefits both to the individuals who will
be able to live long and productive lives and to the
societies, which would not spend disproportionate
amounts of resources to curative medicine, sometimes
with only marginal effectiveness [2, 3]. Does this expected
shift in the power of prediction and prevention, which is
associated with the development of personalised medicine,
raise any ethical concerns? Does the new philosophy in
medicine direct us towards the new paradigm of medical
ethics? These are the questions we will try to address in
this paper.
Personalised medicine and Hippocratic ethics
Let us first turn to the second half of the 20th century,
which marked the emergence of modern medical ethics or
bioethics. One of the most important shifts in the history of
medical ethics was the shift from traditional paternalism,
which requires the physician to benefit his patient accord-
ing to the best of his ability and judgement, to the ethics of
personal autonomy and informed consent based on the
dialogue between the physician and the patient and shared
decision making. This shift has remarkably transformed the
doctor-patient relationship a few decades ago. For example,
cancer patients, who once were not informed about their
disease in order to be protected from the disturbing news
and psychological distress, now are equal partners in the
decision making process concerning their treatment strate-
gy. The latter is now regarded to be the ethically preferable
strategy to be followed in all the societies that respect
human rights [4].
The shift to autonomy-based ethics was influenced by
at least two factors: the rise of the human rights
movement, which has also affected the understanding of
patients’ rights; and the increasing role of chronic
diseases in the general structure of human morbidity
and mortality. The paternalistic character of the “medical
expert”, who is able to predict and unilaterally recom-
mend a treatment strategy to save or prolong the life of
his or her patient, was for many centuries a prevalent
model of physician-patient relationship. This model,
however, has nowadays become hardly compatible with
a good clinical practice where prevalent causes of
morbidity shifted from acute and infectious diseases
towards the chronic diseases. In the context of treating
chronic, neurodegenerative diseases or some types of
cancer there is usually no single best strategy to choose.
The choice here is not between the acceptance and
decline of the life-saving treatment (which is one of the
most important goals in the acute care medicine) but
among several options neither of which offer an effective
cure of the condition. In these circumstances, patient’s
preferences, values and world-views start to play a
crucial role in the medical decision making and therefore
lead to autonomy-based therapeutic relationship.
Another important feature of the traditional Hippo-
cratic ethics is it’s individualism: putting the benefits to
the individual patient above the interests of the commu-
nity. Modern medical ethics has challenged this funda-
mental feature of the Hippocratic tradition as well. Due
to the fact that the cost of modern medicine has risen
enormously during the last few decades, the rationing of
scarce health care resources based on the effectiveness of
health care interventions is becoming a necessary
condition of the sustainable health care system, capable
of providing equitable access to health care services to
the citizens.
At this point we can link the main features of
personalised medicine with the vocabulary of medical
ethics. Increased power of prediction and greater certain-
ty in some therapeutic choices can lead to more directive
type of relationship between the doctor and the patient.
For example, if the physician can distinguish between
different types of cancer and knows that certain types of
this disease are susceptible to certain types of therapy,
which can entirely stop the malignant growth, ought not
she or he use some stronger measures of persuasion and
be more directive towards the non-compliant patients?
Would not this look like some kind of paternalism?
Secondly, should the personalised medicine develop
preventive strategies for many diseases, would not the
enforcement of compliance on the level of health care
system be the most efficient strategy to implement the
benefits of such strategies? Should not we think about
some measures to increase patients’ responsibility for
their own health?
Ethics of genetic testing
Let us first examine those ethical concerns that are related
to the increased power of prediction, which is supposed to
be brought in the near future by the developments in the
field of genetic testing and genetic screening. The impor-
tance of these issues has been reflected in the Additional
Protocol concerning Genetic testing for Health Purposes to
the Council of Europe Convention of Biomedicine and
Human Rights of 2008 (further in the text refered to as
“Additional Protocol”) [5]. For the purposes of this paper
we will concentrate on the following principles: clinical
utility, respect for private life and the right to information
(that also includes the right not to know), sharing of genetic
information between the relatives, and non-directive man-
ner of counselling.
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Clinical utility One of the most important criteria relevant
to both practical implementation and ethical assessment of
genetic testing is its clinical utility. Clinical utility is to be
understood by the value of the test results in guiding the
person concerned in his or her choices regarding prevention
or therapeutic strategies [6]: para 57]. The clinical utility is
mainly determined by two factors: predictive value of the
test and the presence of preventive and therapeutic
strategies related to the condition revealed by the test. The
combination of these factors determines the clinical utility
of the test and, at the same time, the appropriateness of
offering the test to the individual. For example, the
predictive value of the tests for monogenic disorders, e.g.,
Huntington disease (the late onset autosomal dominant
severe neurological disorder), can be very high, however,
therapeutic options are rather limited. Therefore, the offer
of this test to the members of the family who can be the
carriers of the pathological gene is a very sensitive one.
Taking into account that genetic testing can be related to a
very sensitive information and its preventive value can
sometimes only be limited to reproductive choices of the
affected individuals, it should be offered to the persons
concerned with great caution.
The situation is even more complex if the predictive
value of the test is not very high. Take, for example, the
following hypothetical situation: a person undergoes a
genetic test, which predicts a 25 percent chance of
developing cardiovascular disease in the period of 20 years
in case a person continues smoking, as compared to 10
percent chance of developing the disease if smoking is
quitted. What is the practical importance and clinical utility
of the information provided by such a test? Is the difference
between these two situations significant enough to offer the
test and consequently to build a preventive policy?
Respect for private life and the right to information In
modern health care, patients are entitled to know any
information about their health, including the results of
genetic tests. However, our discussion on the criterion of
clinical utility shows how complex the implementation of
these rights can be in the context of predictive uncertainty
and limited therapeutic choices. Therefore, the right to
information is directly linked to two other important
provisions recommended by the Additional Protocol: tests
should be performed under (a) individualised medical
supervision that is followed by (b) appropriate genetic
counselling to prevent misinterpretation of the results and
to soften psychological stress [5].
Wish not to be informed In the field of genetics the right to
information is also linked to another principle—the wish of
a person not to be informed about the results of the genetic
test [5]: Art 16 Para 3]. This is a general principle
applicable in the whole medicine. However, the wish of a
person not to be informed in the context of genetic testing
has its own specificity. Such a situation can arise when a
patient, who has information based on the family history
about a potentially dangerous health status, such as having
a 50 percent chance to be a carrier of the Huntington‘s
disease, prefers not to know the results of the genetic test
concerning this disease carried out for some other purposes.
At the same time it should be acknowledged that
sometimes the patient’s right not to know might conflict
with the doctor’s duty to provide care [6]: Para 57]. It
might happen that making a person knowledgeable about
the results of a test is the only possibility to prevent the
disease or delay its development. In some situations the
right not to know can also be impracticable, e.g. prescribing
certain treatment or recommending consulting a doctor of a
special field may by itself reveal the presence of a disease.
Even more controversial situation can arise if a person
concerned does not want to know the results of the test that
can have impact on the family members. This leads to
another ethical dilemma, whether and under what circum-
stances the results of person’s genetic test can be revealed
to his or her family members.
Do the results of a genetic test belong to a person? Some
authors believe that the development of personalised
medicine can strengthen the family ties because the results
of genetic tests can make people more responsible not only
for their own health but also for their relatives’ too. On the
other hand, it is questionable whether genetic relations
imply any special moral obligation to be responsible for
other people [7].
Information about health and private life is considered to
belong to the patient and therefore it should be kept
confidential by the doctor who is normally only allowed to
reveal this information to the third parties with the patient’s
consent. The most common exception to this rule is the
situation when a non-disclosure can endanger life or health
of the third party or the patient himself or herself. This
situation can be also relevant in the field of genetics
because the information provided by a genetic test can be
not only important to a person who underwent a genetic
testing but also to some of his/her family members. What if
a patient does not agree to communicate this information to
the relatives? Could the confidentiality of the patient be
infringed in this case? Probably. The arguments will depend
on the circumstances of a particular situation. Here we
simply want to point out the collision between the doctor’s
duty to respect the patient’s right to confidentiality and his
or her commitment to safeguard the wellbeing of other
people. The Additional Protocol recommends to inform a
person about the importance for the relatives to have access
to this information, and let him or her to make the decision
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[5]: Art 18]. However, the Protocol leaves it up to the
national legislations to set up the requirements, criteria or
circumstances for indicating situations allowing a doctor to
reveal the information without person’s consent. In some
cases the courts both in Europe and the US enforce the
option of sharing information between the relatives. For
example, a court in New Jersey (US) ruled that the
physician had a duty to directly warn the daughter of a
patient about the risk to develop a colon cancer (which
caused father’s death 25 years ago), perhaps even over her
father's objections [8].
Non-directive manner of counselling Finally, it seems to be
important to stress still another provision of the Additional
Protocol. Its Article 8 requires the genetic counselling to be
given in a “non-directive manner” [5]. This requirement is
an expression of the principle of respect for personal
autonomy which was already presented as one of the
fundamental principles of modern medical ethics. However,
it should be taken into account that the idea of non-directive
counselling as an attempt to avoid any influence or pressure
on a person can be problematic in the context of
personalised medicine. First, indirect pressure can occur
because of a privileged position of a counsellor in terms of
knowledge, experience and social status. Second, and more
important for our discussion, the increased power of
prediction, which is supposed to be achieved due to the
developments of personalised medicine, can significantly
increase this “authority” of a doctor giving advice to the
patient. Especially sensitive situations of this kind can
arrise with regard to reproductive choices that may include
the termination of pregnancy.
Ethical problems that are encountered in the process of
genetic testing will also be faced in relation to the screening
programmes. The importance of clinical utility as well as such
principles as respect for private life and the right to information,
consent and genetic counselling in the context of genetic
screening programmes is also recognised by the Additional
Protocol [6]: Para 61]. The mentioned principles are also
included into the list of criteria for genetic screening
programmes of the UK National Screening Committee [9].
Ethics of prevention
Genetic testing enables both to adjust medical treatment to
genetic characteristics of a patient and to predict the risks of
developing certain diseases, which consequently can help a
patient to take measures to prevent (or at least to delay or
soften) the manifestation of the predicted illness. It is
believed that the ability to detect a susceptibility for a
particular illness before its manifestation and taking
appropriate preventive actions can significantly lower mortality
from certain diseases [10]. The move towards preventive
policies promises remarkable improvements in health care
delivery. However, it also raises ethical concerns related to the
need of enforcing certain behaviors and life-styles. In this
section we will concentrate on the policies that offer rewards
or limitations of access to some types of health care services.
Access to health care in the context of personalised
medicine Any consideration to impose sanctions for a
certain health-related behavior or life-style is problematic
due to a long-standing tradition of universal health care
coverage. This tradition most probably has its roots in a
strong feeling of solidarity, which encourages to provide
access to health care irrespective of the ability to pay or
other social factors. However, another reason not to place
the responsibility on the shoulders of patients could be the
complexity of differentiating between the conditions where
a certain disease was a result of a genetic predisposition
from those where the crucial factor in developing the
disease was “unhealthy” life-style.
Personalised medicine seems to offer a distinction
between these two factors and therefore weakens the
background of the traditional conception of health care,
which avoids imposing responsibility on patients for their
health status. An additional factor, which has been
challenging this traditional “responsibility free” access
to health care, was a dramatic increase of expenditure on
modern health care. For example, the U.S. government
spent more than $2.3 trillion on health care in 2008 (on
average $7,681 per person), more than three times the
$714 billion in 1990, according to the Kaiser Family
Foundation [11]. In order to keep the portion of the GDP
allocated to health care on approximately the same level,
the countries are forced to introduce strategies to prioritise
and ration health care services. In this context personalised
medicine seems also to be contributing by developing
tools to distinguish between high—and low-efficiency
interventions to particular groups of patients, which is an
important instrument for rationing scarce health care
resources. This can require difficult allocation decisions
to be faced by the physicians and patients in situations
where the efficiency of treatment will be rather different in
different groups of patients suffering from the same
disease. For example, it has been already established that
the treatment of a colorectal cancer with panitumumab and
cetuximab is most effective for patients without particular
mutations in the KRAS gene. However, even in this group
patients do not show the same response to the drug—only
some achieve the maximal gain of 2 years of life, whereas
others gain just 2 months [12]. If it were possible to clearly
distinguish the patients who fall into a particular group, would
not this also affect the allocation decisions in a way that those
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gaining only two months of life would not be eligible for the
treatment, especially if it is an expensive one?
Personal responsibility for health Having in mind the
possible implications of personalised medicine both to the
disease prevention and to the access to health care services
debate, let us now turn to the central ethical issue of
prevention—personal responsibility for one’s own health.
Are the obese, smoking, drinking, or physically not suffi-
ciently active persons responsible for their ill health? Should
there be any sanctions for those who do not comply with the
rules of “healthy lifestyle”, which is commonly associated
with proper weight, non-smoking, keeping the appointments
and following the advice of a doctor? However, these are not
entirely new issues in the health care debate. As has been
pointed out earlier, the progress in genetic prediction raises their
ethical relevance and reveals new complexities. For example, if
a genetic test helps to distinguish between genetic and non-
genetic (social) factors contributing to the development of the
disease and reveals that a person has a 50 percent chance to
develop a colonic cancer, should the policy makers make an
attempt to create incentives or even force a person to choose a
certain life-style if it is known that certain measures (e.g., diet,
exercising, quitting-smoking, regular check-up) can prevent the
development of the disease? What would happen if the disease
would develop and it would be known that a person hadn’t
complied or only partly complied with the “prevention plan”
that has been offered? Would this also mean that the public
funds shouldn’t be used for the treatment of such a person or
that he or she should pay part of the price of the treatment?
Enforcing personal responsibility Although nowadays pol-
icies to make people responsible for their own health seems
to be quite rare, there have recently been several attempts to
implement the idea of personal responsibility for health in
practice. For example, some Primary Care Trusts (UK)
refuse to perform hip or joint surgery or even any routine
operation for smoking patients or patients with BMI
exceeding 30. In Germany, patients who keep their check-
up schedule can pay less for their dental care than those
who do not. At the same time, the financial incentives are also
offered for those who are considered to comply with the health
maintenance measures, such as participating in age-related
health promotion or screening programmes. Depriving insured
persons of a right to free treatment of complications arising
from “lifestyle” related choices (such as cosmetic surgery,
tattoos, or piercing) have been regarded as one of the most
controversial elements of the German reform [13].
Another example of enforcing responsibility for health
comes from the U.S. The West Virginia Medicaid pro-
grammes covering health care services for low income
population was redesigned to reduce basic services for most
healthy children and adults, but gave an opportunity to get
more benefits if they agree to sign and comply with the
provisions of a “Medicaid Member Agreement”. The
Agreement says that “To remain in the enhanced plan,
members must keep their medical appointments, receive
screenings, take their medications, and follow health
improvement plans. Members whose benefits are to be
reduced because they have not met these criteria will receive
advance notice and have the right to appeal. Those who meet
their health goals will receive “credits” that will be placed in a
“Healthy Rewards Account” to be used for purchasing services
that are not covered by the Medicaid plan” [14].
Although these practices might look attractive from the
first sight, they raise some difficult questions of how
justifiable the measures that enforce so-called healthy
behavior are. How far can the governments and the health
care providers go in enforcing people to live “healthy” life?
Are people responsible for being obese or drug/alcohol addicts
or are they just the victims of their social environment,
conditions in the family, educational background? Even taking
into account that a right to accessible health care is not an
absolute right, it seems that the discussed cases might bring
some suspicion concerning possible discrimination based on
person’s genetic characteristics, health condition or life style at
least as far as these factors in many cases are still not clearly
separable. Most of national and international guidelines, legal
acts and policy documents dealing with patients’ rights or
specifically genetic data, stress the importance of genetic
privacy and necessity of safeguards against discrimination on
genetic grounds [5]: Art 4; [15]: Art 7].
This does not, however, mean that all the measures of
putting more responsibility on the people for their own
health contradict human solidarity and right to self-
determination. For example, taking into account that missing
appointments with the GPs and nurses can seriously disrupt the
provision of health care services (e.g. English patients missed
11 million appointments with GPs in 2006), we can be rather
positive about the appeals to patients to take seriously their
responsibilities by cancelling appointments in time [13]. It
seems that the tendency of putting more responsibility on the
shoulders of patients will be even more strengthened in the
context of personalised medicine. However, we have to be
aware that “the more one moves away from the incentive-
focused end of the spectrum to the disincentive/penalty end,
the higher the risk of increasing unfairness and potential
“victim-blaming” [13] of already vulnerable populations.
Research ethics issues in personalised medicine
The development of personalised medicine is based on
intensive scientific research which by itself raises many
ethical issues. Let us mention several of them. The
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development of screening programmes and targeted indi-
vidualised treatment options for specific types of diseases
fuelled a new wave of research on human biological
materials. National genome projects and disease-oriented
biobanks are being established all over the world and
increasing attention is paid to the legal and ethical frame-
works that regulate this type of research. The problem is
that in this field of research the idea of specific consent,
which is relevant to clinical research protocols with clearly
defined aims, design and plan of interventions, could hardly
be applicable since in large-scale genome projects and
biobanks it is not possible to envisage in detail all potential
future uses of biological samples. Some countries have
already developed new legislation which allows to meet
these new challenges. To mention but a few examples, the
provisions of broad consent were implemented in Estonia
and the UK, which run population-based genome projects,
as well as in Norway, which has recently included the
provisions of “broad consent” into its research legislation
[16]: Ch 4, Sec 14]. Similar tendencies can also be
observed at the European level in the Council of Europe
Recommendation on Research on Biological Materials of
Human Origin of 2006 [17]. The Explanatory Memoran-
dum to this instrument has introduced a distinction between
the interventions that aim at removing materials for use in a
specific research project from those interventions where the
sample is removed for research storage. The latter option is
combined with a broader type of consent, which does not
require to describe specific aims of research projects for
which the biological sample can be used in the future [18].
The Recommendation Rec(2006)4 and some other docu-
ments also introduce the idea of so-called multi-layered or
“tiered” consent [19], which enables donors to choose from
several options ranging form allowing to use his or her
biological sample only in one particular disease-specific
research project to allowing the sample to be used for all
possible future research.
Communicating the incidental findings of genetic testing
obtained during the biobanking research to the donor is
another issue which raised ethical concerns due to the
tension between researcher’s obligation to protect confi-
dentiality of research participants and his or her commit-
ment to provide feedback on accidental health related
findings to them [20]. There has been so far no agreement
on this issue. On the one hand, a possibility of the feedback
of health-related information to the research participants is
an attractive offer, which can encourage people to take part
in the research [19]. On the other hand, the participant’s
wish to know the results of genetic testing can endanger
protection of his or her personal data since sharing of
information involves more risks to “leak” the information
to the third parties and to infringe the confidentiality. In
addition, this question raises concerns related to the clinical
utility of the test and possible psychological harm these
results can cause if they are presented to the patient without
a proper genetic counselling.
These are not the only research ethics issues raised in the
context of personalised medicine. For example, there have
been some important insights about the need to change
prevalent study designs in cancer research and to move
from large-scale clinical trials to small comparative trials
based on groups of patients who have different predictive
biomarkers. The problem is that in large scale research,
such as phase III clinical trials, the subgroups of patients
who do not benefit from new therapeutic interventions can
suffer a detrimental effect of the investigational therapy.
This can be prevented if the study on predictive biomarkers
is introduced in the early phases of research and these
biomarkers are used to differentiate between treatment-
resistant and treatment-efficient patients. What is important
to our discussion, the early studies that reveal the predictive
biomarkers can lead us to rethink the choice of the
comparative groups. Traditional approach to this type of
research has been to avoid a comparative group that
receives no active treatment. However, given a possibility
of cancer-promoting or low-efficiency effect of an antican-
cer intervention, a group of untreated patients might be seen
as an acceptable choice [21] in the context of scientific
research in the field of personalised medicine.
Concluding remarks
The promises and aspirations of personalised medicine are
well-taken and could indeed in the foreseeable future lead to
what has been described as the paradigm change in health
care. However, increased predictive power of medicine and
targeted therapeutic interventions are not only promisingmore
efficient treatment for patients, improved quality of longer
human lives and effective use of scarce health care resources.
This paradigmatic change also requires to take a fresh look on
the ethical and social implications of the new medicine. One
of the central ethical issues emerging in this context is
increasing role of personal responsibility for health, which is
an understandable consequence of the shift from reactive
disease-treatment oriented medicine towards the proactive
approach of preventive medicine with an emphasis on
personal responsibility for health. At the moment the health
care systems of many countries are only making their first
steps towards the balancing of the traditional solidarity-based
medicine with the new ethos of patient responsibility for his or
her better health prevention. However, the slip to the “victim-
blaming” scenario, where vulnerable people are deprived of
treatment arguing that they are responsible for their poor
health, while the factors that contributed to it are beyond their
control [13], is to be avoided.
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The emphasis on prediction and prevention can also affect
the individual physician-patient relationship. The role of the
health care practitioner as a neutral moderator providing the
non-directive counselling in the context of personalised
medicine, which emphasizes the measures of prevention and
offers high levels of prediction, can also be questioned. It
seems that a temptation towards a more directive approach in
respect to non-compliant patients can be observed. However,
such an approach should not infringe on patients’ rights,
which, among others, include the right to privacy and self-
determination. Physician-patient relationship can also be
affected by the emerging differentiation of patients into
different groups according to their resistance/efficiency with
regard to the treatment interventions. It will not be an easy
choice to the doctor to tell a patient that a particular treatment
is not available due to the fact that its efficiency does not reach
a certain threshold.
Finally, developing personalised diagnostic techniques in
the free-market societies can raise some other problems as
well. We are already facing a rapid introduction of direct-
to-consumer genetic testing into the market. On the one
hand, it shifts the responsibility for some important health
care choices to the patients and increases their self-
determination. On the other hand, this process leaves space
for detrimental consequences such as the risk of psycho-
logical harm and misinterpretation of the test since it is
difficult to make sure that direct-to-consumer predictive
genetic testing is followed by individualised medical
supervision and genetic counselling.
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